Non-technical summary
The Great Recession of 2007-09 brought about a puzzle in the United States with respect to the relationship between inflation and slack in the economy. According to the historical relationship between these two variables, the observed response of inflation to the high levels of spare capacity in the United States was rather muted.
The literature has provided some reasons for the apparent breakdown in the Phillips curve -the "missing deflation puzzle": (i) inflation expectations have become more anchored, reflecting an increase in central bank credibility (Ball and Mazumder 2011 , Watson 2014 , Hatzius and Stehn 2014 ; (ii) the importnace of (external) supply shocks has increased over time, implying that inflation has become less sensitive to domestic developments (Gordon 2013 , Watson 2014 (iii) difficulties in the measurement of labour market slack, especially in the light of the large decline in participation rate (Gordon 2013 , Krueger et al. 2014 , Rudebusch and Williams 2014 , Watson 2014 ; and , finally, (iv) the existence of non-linearities in the relationship between inflation and labour market slack (Debelle and Laxton 1997 , Ball and Mazumder 2011 , Peach et al. 2011 , Hatzius and Stehn 2014 .
Against this background, we revisit the Phillips curve relationship in the United States in the following ways. First, we employ several alternative slack measures in hybrid Phillips curves to find out which measure of slack is most relevant in determining inflation dynamics. Particular relevance is given to the slack derived from a new labour market tracking indicator (LMTI) that we build, which captures broader labour market conditions. Second, we shed some light on the question of whether the Phillips curve slope varies over time and explore the relevance of different theories of non-linearities in the Phillips curve. Finally, we assess the forecasting accuracy of a suite of linear and non-linear Phillips curve models.
Our main findings suggest that a Phillips curve model augmented with supply shocks and inflation expectations, estimated between 1992Q1 and 2007Q4, can explain rather well the behaviour of inflation after the Great Recession, with little apparent evidence of a missing deflation puzzle. We find that the Phillips curve specification with slack measured by the LMTI is consistently among the best performing specifications, together with the headline, mediumterm and long-term unemployment gaps. More important than the choice of the slack measure, however, is the consideration of a time-variation in the Phillips curve slope. Regressions on a rolling window as well as time-varying estimates using the Kalman filter confirm that the slope does vary over time.
In an out-of-sample forecasting exercise, our models that take into account the time-varying nature of the slope coefficient exhibit the highest forecasting accuracy over 2008Q1 to 2015Q1.
In addition, we find that the other (constant-slope) non-linear specifications explored in this paper do not seem to improve on the forecasting accuracy of the linear models.
Introduction
Following the Great Recession of 2007-09, a widely-held view is that the response of inflation to the high levels of spare capacity in the United States was rather muted. For example, using Phillips curves estimated over long data samples, Ball and Mazumder (2011) find that inflation should have fallen by more than it did over the period . This "missing deflation puzzle" has also surprised policymakers (Williams 2010) . 1 This puzzle has led to an intense debate over whether the Phillips curve is still "alive", as argued by Gordon (2013) and Coibion and Gorodnichenko (2015) .
The literature has provided some reasons for the apparent breakdown in the Phillips curve.
First, inflation expectations have become more anchored, reflecting an increase in central bank credibility (Ball and Mazumder 2011 , Watson 2014 , Hatzius and Stehn 2014 . Second, the role of (external) supply shocks has increased over time, resulting in inflation becoming less sensitive to domestic developments (Gordon 2013 , Watson 2014 . Third, difficulties in the measurement of labour market slack, especially in the light of the large decline in participation rate (Gordon 2013 , Krueger et al. 2014 , Rudebusch and Williams 2014 , Watson 2014 . Fourth, the existence of non-linearities in the relationship between inflation and labour market slack due, for instance, to the presence of downward nominal wage rigidities that have dampened the fall in inflation (Debelle and Laxton 1997 , Ball and Mazumder 2011 , Peach et al. 2011 , Hatzius and Stehn 2014 .
Finally, fiscal policy may also help explain the absence of deflation during the Great Recession, in that the combination of policy uncertainty surrounding policy makers's future behaviour at the zero lower bound and the inflationary pressure stemming from an existing large stock of debt may have prevented the economy from entering a deflationary state (Bianchi and Melosi 2014) .
Another potential reason for a breakdown in the Phillips curve is the possibility of mismeasurement in labour market slack. This has become particularly relevant in the recent business cycle. This raises the question of how to best measure economic slack and what concept of slack is most appropriate in determining movements in inflation, as Yellen (2014) noted, "The assessment of labor market slack is rarely simple and has been especially challenging recently".
On the one hand, some economists and policymakers have pointed out that during the economic recovery that followed the Great Recession, slack in the labour market may have been more substantial than suggested by the unemployment gap. In particular, Yellen (2014) indicates that the decline in the unemployment rate since the Great Recession may have overstated the improvement in overall labour market conditions, as shown by a labour market conditions index developed by Federal Reserve Board staff. In this view, the existence of more slack in the labour market than measured by the unemployment gap could have led to a temporary breakdown in the Phillips curve.
On the other hand, other researchers have concluded that in recent years, narrower measures of slack may be more relevant in determining inflation, with prices appearing to respond more to short-term unemployment (defined as the unemployed for less than 26 weeks) rather than to headline unemployment (Gordon 2013 , Krueger et al. 2014 , Rudebusch and Williams 2014 , Watson 2014 . This finding has not remained uncontested, however, as shown for example by Kiley (2014) .
Against this background, our main contribution to this strand of literature consists of the following. First, we employ various alternative slack measures in hybrid Phillips curves augmented with import prices and inflation expectations in order to investigate what measure of slack is most relevant in determining inflation dynamics. Among the slack measures we use, particular relevance is given to the slack derived from a new labour market tracking indicator (LMTI) that we develop, which aims at capturing broader labour market conditions. Second, we revisit the question of whether the Phillips curve slope varies over time and explore the relevance of different theories of non-linearities in the Phillips curve. Third, we assess the forecasting accuracy of a suite of linear and non-linear Phillips curve models by comparing their root mean squared forecast errors.
Our main findings suggest that a Phillips curve model with import prices, inflation expectations and a measure of slack in the economy, estimated between 1992Q1 and 2007Q4, can explain rather well the behaviour of inflation after the Great Recession, with little apparent evidence of a missing deflation puzzle. We find that the Phillips curve specification with slack measured by the LMTI is consistently among the best performing specifications, together with the headline, medium-term and long-term unemployment gaps. More important than the choice of slack measure, however, appears to be the consideration of a time-variation in the Phillips curve slope. Regressions for a rolling window as well as time-varying estimates of the slope coefficient using the Kalman filter suggest that the slope does vary over time; we find tentative evidence that the slope may have increased slightly since 2013. In terms of forecasting, our out-ofsample exercise indicates that models that take into account the time-varying nature of the slope coefficient had the highest forecasting accuracy over 2008Q1 to 2015Q1. Another result worth highlighting relates to the fact that the constant-slope non-linear specifications explored in this paper do not seem to improve on the forecasting accuracy of the linear models.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we discuss the measurement of labour market slack in more detail and introduce our own measure of slack based on a labour market tracking indicator. In Section 3, we present Phillips curve models using these measures of slack in the economy. Section 4 investigates whether the slope coefficient of the Phillips curve is time-varying. In addition, we examine whether the dynamics of US inflation are better characterised by certain specific non-linear rather than linear relationships between labour market slack and inflation. Section 5 compares the forecasting accuracy of a suite of linear and non-linear Phillips curve models. Section 6 concludes. we employ a number of alternative measures of slack, defined as follows -see Table A .1 in the Appendix for descriptive statistics (data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, BLS):
• Unemployment gap (UGAP): difference between the estimated non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment (NAIRU), published by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), and the unemployment rate.
• Short-term unemployment gap (STUGAP): difference between the long-term average of the unemployment rate with a duration up to 26 weeks and the actual data of this series.
• Medium-term unemployment gap (MTUGAP): difference between the long-term average of the unemployment rate with a duration between 27 and 51 weeks and the actual data of this series.
• Long-term unemployment gap (LTUGAP): difference between the long-term average of the unemployment rate with a duration of 27 weeks and over and the actual data of this series.
• Combined unemployment and participation gap (UPRGAP): sum of unemployment and participation gaps, with the latter defined as the gap between the structural and cyclical labour force participation rates, as estimated by the CBO.
• Output gap (OGAP): output gap estimate published by the CBO.
The most prominent and commonly used measure of slack in the labour market is defined as One such indication is that long-term unemployment remains much above its long-term average, reflecting the severity of the last recession. Another sign is that much of the decline in the unemployment rate has been the result of a drop in the labour force participation rate rather than from job creation, explaining around 3/4 of the change in the unemployment rate from its peak in October 2009 (from 10% to 5.3% in June 2015). While Erceg and Levin (2014) argue that the bulk of the decline is attributable to cyclical factors, most of the recent literature finds that a combination of structural and cyclical reasons account for the decline in the participation rate (Cline and Nolan 2014 , Aaronson et al. 2012 , Hall 2014 , CBO 2014 . Demographic shifts and a growing reliance on disability programmes have been found to be the most important structural factors, while extended student enrolment times in a weak economic environment as well as discouragement of workers due to poor economic prospects are the most prominent cyclical factors. This could lead to hysteresis effects, i.e. cyclical factor turning structural. Nevertheless, there is a significant amount of uncertainty regarding the extent to which discouraged workers may permanently leave the labour force due to skills losses.
Since the cyclical part of the decline in the participation rate is likely to be reversed as the recovery gains momentum, reflecting a gradual re-absorption of those who left the labour market temporarily, the cyclical gap between the actual participation rate and an estimated potential participation rate can be interpreted as additional labour market slack or "reserve labour supply", that can be combined with the unemployment gap. Such a combined estimate of the unemployment and participation gap would suggest more slack in the labour market than the slack based on the unemployment gap alone (Figure 1 ). While in the early stage of the recent economic recovery, the unemployment gap was the main contributor of the combined gap, the participation gap subsequently assumed a bigger role in driving total labour market slack. Table 1 , over 1985Q1 to 2015Q2. 4 We focus on this narrow set of variables as it has the advantage of not only capturing the different characteristics of the labour market, but also of being published on a timely basis. 5 The principal component approach models the variance structure of a set of variables using linear combinations of the variables. The first principal component can be interpreted as a summary statistic that captures the common movement among the eight variables, i.e. it gives us the estimate of a signal about the labour market which is common to all the series. In our sample, the first principal component explains 65% of the overall variance of the variables considered (the first and second components together explain 84% of the variance). The employment-topopulation ratio and the number of part-time workers for economic reasons have the largest weights in the LMTI, followed by the long-term and standard unemployment rate. The signs of the correlations of each indicator with the LMTI confirm our priors, with, for instance, an increase in the unemployment rate being associated with a worsening in the LMTI, whereas an increase in the employment-to-population ratio being associated with an improvement in the indicator. 6
The LMTI estimates reveal that the labour market was much weaker than suggested by the unemployment rate for most of the period since the end of the Great Recession and remained from fully recovering to pre-crisis levels by 2015Q2 (Figure 2a) . Overall, the LMTI was tracking the unemployment rate quite closely until around the end of 2011, but thereafter the two series started to diverge markedly. In 2015Q2, the LMTI stood at around 1.1 standard deviations below the historical mean, and below the pre-crisis peak. The weakness of the labour market Note: The LMTI and the unemployment rate on the left-hand chart have been normalised (zero mean and unit standard deviation). The range of other slack measures on the right-hand chart includes the unemployment gap, the short-term, medium-term and long-term unemployment gaps, the output gap, as well as the combined unemployment and participation gaps. LMTI U (rhs, inverted scale)
6 As robustness checks, we expanded the LMTI with more labour market series, namely by taking into account survey data (National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB)'s percentage of firms with positions not able to fill, percentage of firms planning to increase employment, the ISM manufacturing employment index), jobless claims, hires rate and quits rate. While the results were quantitatively and qualitatively broadly unchanged, higher publication lags of some of those series prevents us from having a timely indicator going forward. The hires and quits rate pose additional challenges as they only go back to December 2000. Moreover, the LMTI also remained robust to alternative sample periods by, for instance, deleting 5 years of data at a time.
7 The slack implied by the LMTI is calculated as the difference between the NAIRU (estimated by the CBO) and the fitted values from regressing the unemployment rate on the LMTI plus a constant. An alternative option would have been to define LMTI slack as the LMTI relative to its own long-term average. We chose the former approach as it takes into account the possible time-varying nature of the NAIRU.
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Baseline specification
We now analyse what the different measures of slack imply for inflation, by employing a Phillips curve framework. We estimate hybrid Phillips curves (Gali and Gertler 1999) , where it is assumed that some firms are forward-looking and set prices optimally to maximise profits, while the rest are backward-looking and set current prices according to past values. The resulting
Phillips curve specification relates current inflation to both future inflation expected at time t and lagged inflation, thus allowing for inflation persistence:
where θ 0 is a constant term, π t refers to the current inflation rate, measured as the annual change in the headline personal consumption expenditure (PCE) deflator, E t π t+1 is the expectation of the future inflation rate, andŷ t is a measure of slack in the economy.
Following Gordon (2007) Gali and Gertler (1999) , by the set of slack indicators introduced in Section 2. This results in the following equation that will be used in the estimation:
where π * t+1 are the SPF's ten-year ahead inflation expectations and pm t is the annual percentage change in import prices.
In the next section, we estimate equation (2) for 1992Q1-2015Q1. The starting point is dictated by data availability on long-term inflation expectations, and an attempt at avoiding distortions by the inflation regime shift in the 1980s, when inflation expectations dropped significantly, having become more anchored. The preferred specification contains two lags on the dependent variable and on import prices, which was found to be sufficient to ensure white noise residuals.
Regression results
The Phillips curve estimates from Table 2 suggest that PCE inflation is very persistent, as indicated by a highly statistically significant coefficient on the lagged dependent variable of roughly 0.8 -it shows how strongly dependent current inflation is on past inflation. Similarly, inflation expectations are generally (borderline) significant. Import prices and labour market gaps also play a role in explaining movements in inflation. (in parentheses) . The dependent variable is the year-on-year change in the PCE deflator over 1992Q1-2015Q1. ∆ 4 denotes year-on-year percentage-point changes. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
In our hybrid Phillips curve estimates, the measures of slack in the economy are strongly statistically significant at conventional levels, irrespective of the slack measure considered. 9
For instance, a one-percentage-point increase in the unemployment gap (implying less slack in the economy) would lead to an increase of PCE inflation of about 0.04 percentage points (column 1). This value is somewhat below those available in the literature -0.14 in Hatzius and Stehn (2014), 0.2-0.25 in Mazumder (2011), 0.3 in Fitzgerald and Nicolini (2014) , and 0.5 in Gordon (2013) . According to the dynamics in our model, the long-term impact of the unemployment gap on inflation is of around 0.16. 10 9 Table A .2 in the Appendix shows that it is harder to uncover the statistical significance for some of the slack measures when short-term inflation expectations are used instead. This may be related to the higher volatility of the series and also to the fact that the reference price indicator, due to data unavailability, is not the same as the dependent variable.
10 The long-term effect of a variable is its short-run coefficient divided by 1 minus the lagged coefficients on
The fact that our coefficient on the unemployment gap is smaller compared to others might be related to: (i) a different dependent variable, as core CPI is used in Hatzius and Stehn (2014) , CPI in Ball and Mazumder (2011) and Fitzgerald and Nicolini (2014) ; (ii) different time samples, with, for instance, the paper by Gordon (2013) going back to the 60s, which might explain the high coefficient of about 0.5; and (iii) differences in the specifications, namely the number of lags. As a robustness check, we get qualitatively the same results when we use annual inflation based on the Consumer Price Index (CPI) as the dependent variable (Table A .3 in the Appendix). One of the differences is that the coefficients on the slack measures are generally twice as large, making them more comparable with those available in the literature. Moreover, our main regression results are also robust to the use of core PCE inflation (excluding food and energy) as the dependent variable (Table A .4 in the Appendix). 11
Our estimates presented above assume that inflation expectations (whether short-or long-term ones) and the alternative measures of slack in the economy are exogenous in the Phillips curve framework. While it is rather standard in the literature to make such assumptions, it might instead be the case that the causality runs the other way around, or that the aforementioned variables are jointly determined. To account for a potential endogeneity bias in our specification, we resort to the Instrumental Variables (IV) estimator. Long-term inflation expectations and our measures of slack are instrumented with 2 lags of their own variables (commonly used as instruments). We find that our baseline results remain robust to the potential endogeneity bias (Table A .5 in the Appendix).
The Phillips curve specifications can shed some light on the "missing deflation puzzle". The with weak balance sheets tend to raise prices in response to negative demand or financial shocks (Gilchrist et al. 2015) .
Using an estimation window that ends in 2007Q4, and resorting to Equation 2, we produce dynamic out-of-sample forecasts of PCE inflation for the period 2008Q1 to 2015Q1, conditional on the actual paths for inflation expectations, the slack variables and import prices. By stopping our estimation sample at the end of 2007, we observe how our model behaves during and after the dependent variable: 0.16=0.043/(1-0.793+0.069). 11 The only difference from the specification with the headline PCE deflator is that we replace total import prices with non-petroleum goods import prices.
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the Great Recession, a period characterised by significant financial turbulence.
According to our results, there is little evidence of a missing deflation puzzle, as our dynamic model forecasts capture rather well the dynamics of actual inflation (Figure 3) . We also find that the first two reasons above put forward by the literature to solve this puzzle could be most relevant. More anchored inflation expectations may have played a role in stabilising inflation during the 2007-09 recession (point (i) above), and including supply shocks in the Phillips curve framework also appears to be important, as the same linear model without import prices (not shown here) predicts deflation during the early period of the Great Recession (point (ii)).
In contrast, we do not find evidence that corroborates point (iii) above on the potential mismeasurement of the existing slack in the economy. According to Figure 3 , all of our out-of-sample forecasts with the Phillips curve models are close to actual inflation outturns during and after the last recession, irrespective of the slack measure used, where the range of Phillips curve forecasts of PCE inflation shown in the chart is taken from the four models with the lowest root mean square error (RMSE) -the models with the standard unemployment gap, the mediumterm unemployment gap, the long-term unemployment gap, and the LMTI gap. The inflation forecasts were slightly above actual inflation in the early period of the US downturn -the last recession started in 2007Q4 and ended in 2009Q2, according to the NBER -this was mainly due to rising import and oil prices until summer 2008, which pushed up the PCE inflation forecast. the estimation period, ignoring any possible changes in the slope over time. Meanwhile, the Phillips curve relationship has been much discussed recently, with the debate turning to the question of whether inflation could rise in a non-linear fashion once labour market slack has been eliminated. We add to this debate by exploring the question of whether the Phillips curve slope is time-varying in our sample, while also exploring in more detail the role of some specific non-linearities. Table 2 showed that our estimates of the Phillips curve slope vary between 0.025 and 0.17, depending on the measure of slack used. But these are average coefficients over a (relatively) long sample. We investigate whether the relationship between slack and inflation may change over time with the following two approaches.
Time-varying Phillips curve slope
The first one involves rolling regressions, using the hybrid Phillips curve model with the unemployment gap. We initially estimate this model from 1992Q1 to 2004Q4 (13 years), which we consider a sufficiently long time sample in order to draw some inference on the robustness of the coefficient on the unemployment gap. 12 The estimation window is then rolled forward one quarter at a time, ensuring that the number of observations remains constant across specifications. The results shown in Figure 4 indicate that over the last 10 years, the coefficient on the unemployment gap has been steadily increasing from as low as 0.02 to close to 0.07 more recently. In the second approach, we also allow the slope of the Phillips curve, as well as the coefficients on inflation expectations, lagged inflation, and import price inflation, to be time-varying, by 12 The analysis is robust to employing alternative rolling samples and alternative measures of slack.
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using the Kalman filter in a state space form of the model, with the signal equation (3) and state equations (4), (5), (6) and (7), respectively, defined in the following manner:
where δ t , α t , κ t and µ t are the state variables. The error term t is normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 e . The state variables are modelled as follows:
where v t , w t , z t and q t are normally distributed with mean zero and variances σ 2 v , σ 2 w , σ 2 z and σ 2 q , respectively. The model is estimated via Maximum Likelihood. 13 Figure 5 shows the Kalman smoothed estimates of the time-varying Phillips curve slope coefficient, δ t , taking the standard unemployment gap as the slack measure, together with a 1-standard error (84%/16%) confidence interval (all time-varying coefficients are shown in Figure   A .2 in the Appendix). 14 13 The variance σ 2 e is estimated, while the other variances are assumed to be fixed. 14 Our estimates of the other time-varying coefficients suggest that US inflation has become less persistent over time, in line with the findings of other researchers, see for example the discussion in Williams (2006) . In addition, inflation appears to have become more anchored to long-term inflation expectations (as shown by the increase in the coefficient on inflation expectations), while the influence of import price inflation has also risen over time.
The results broadly confirm the earlier result that the slope of the Phillips curve varies over time. There is also some tentative evidence that the slope may have steepened somewhat since mid-2013: the average slope coefficient since then is 0.15, although not statistically significant over the entire period. Overall, the findings from the Kalman filter estimates support the view that the trade-off between slack and inflation could be modelled as a non-linear relationship.
Threshold and other non-linear Phillips curve models
The results of Section 4.1 may suggest that a non-linear model may fit better the Phillips curve relationship. Non-linearities could be caused by a number of factors. Peach et al. (2011) have investigated the role of threshold effects, where slack needs to fall below or rise above a certain critical value before noticeably driving movements in inflation.
Meanwhile, Akerlof et al. (1996) highlight the importance of downward nominal wage rigidities, which imply that wages might respond asymmetrically in periods of low versus high labour market slack. While wages are bid up when the labour market is tight, they might be less responsive once high levels of slack would require a decline in wages as downward rigidities prevent firms from lowering wages during downturns. 15 The authors argue that such downward wage constraints act like a real cost shock, which constrained firms pass on to consumers in terms of higher prices, similar in spirit to Gilchrist et al. (2015) . Thereby, wage rigidities can also influence inflation dynamics. Their model would imply that the Phillips curve may be flatter in times when the unemployment rate is high and turn steeper as slack is eliminated. An illustration of this is shown in Figure 6 . While in the linear model the coefficient on UGAP is constant, in the non-linear model, the coefficient on slack is larger (smaller) when the unemployment rate is low (high). At some point, firms may raise wages at a significantly more rapid pace once "pent-up wage deflation" has been absorbed (Yellen 2014) . 16 According to Debelle and Laxton (1997) , under this type 15 See also International Monetary Fund (2013) and Stock and Watson (2010) . 16 Using data across industries, Daly and Hobijn (2015) investigate the role of pent-up wage deflation and find of non-linearity, the economy has to operate longer in the region of slack (compared with no slack) to prevent inflation from drifting upward over time, which has been the case for the United
States at least since 1985. In a similar vein, Kumar and Orrenius (2014) find evidence that their wage-price Phillips curve is non-linear and convex in that declines in the unemployment rate below its historical average exert a stronger pressure on wages than declines at above-average unemployment rates.
Another type of non-linearity may arise as in a low-inflation environment it is less costly for firms to leave prices unchanged (as menu costs are lower), so that firms may adjust prices less frequently. Consequently, inflation may react less strongly to changes in demand in times of low inflation (Dotsey et al. 1999 , Ball et al. 1988 ).
Overall, the presence of such non-linearities may lead to a sudden rise in inflationary pressuresmore strongly than suggested by a linear Phillips curve -as inflation may become more sensitive to slack at some point in the course of the expansion.
We revisit the issue by focusing on three specific forms of non-linearities. First, we use simple thresholds for the unemployment gap, corresponding to the 75th and 25th percentiles in our sample. Second, we test the extent to which the slope of the Phillips curve depends on the labour market tightness, by allowing the unemployment gap to have a larger impact on inflation when unemployment is low. This is done by dividing UGAP by the level of the unemployment rate, following the approach by Debelle and Laxton (1997) . The third approach explores the role of state-dependent pricing, building on De Veirman (2007)'s work on Japan, whereby the slope of the Phillips curve depends on the level of trend inflation, as shown in Equation 8:
whereπ t is trend inflation. We define trend inflation as the average annual inflation rate over the previous ten years (it excludes the current inflation rate so as to avoid potential endogeneity issues).
Our results provide tentative evidence that threshold effects and downward wage rigidities may indeed play a role. Using the aforementioned thresholds for the unemployment gap, 17 we find that the unemployment gap only affects inflation in a statistically significant way when it lies outside of those threshold values (Table 3 , column 2). 18 As regards the Debelle-Laxton nonlinear model, the coefficient on the unemployment gap divided by the level of the unemployment rate is highly statistically significant, providing some support to the view that the slope of the Phillips curve depends on the degree of the labour market tightness (column 3).
By contrast, we do not find any statistical evidence of the slope varying with the level of trend inflation (column 4). Although δ 2 -the coefficient on the slack measure interacted with trend some evidence that the reluctance of firms to cut wages during the downturn has restrained wage growth during the recovery following the Great Recession. 17 Upper threshold of 0.18 and a lower threshold of -0.92. Our findings are robust to employing alternative thresholds (e.g. 70th/30th or 80th/20th percentiles).
18 Our findings are consistent with a recent study by Peach et al. (2011) , who estimate the thresholds based on a grid search approach. For a sample starting in the 1950s, they find optimal threshold values (set to be symmetric) of +/-1.56. OLS regressions with Newey-West corrected standard errors (in parentheses). The dependent variable is the year-on-year change in the PCE deflator over 1992Q1-2015Q1. INTHRES is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when UGAP falls within the thresholds and 0 otherwise. EXTHRES is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when UGAP falls outside of these thresholds. The constant term and the coefficients on lagged inflation, inflation expectations and import prices are not shown.
inflation -is negative, suggesting that the Phillips curve slope was flatter when trend inflation was lower, the coefficient is not statistically significant. Our finding may be related to the fact that trend inflation was relatively stable during most of our sample period (ranging between 3.8% at the beginning of 1992 to 1.8% during 2003-05). In fact, a much sharper decline in trend inflation occurred between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, a period during which the impact of state-dependent pricing may have been more important.
The forecasting performance of different specifications
In this section we compare the forecasting accuracy of the linear hybrid Phillips curve model, introduced in Section 3, with the alternative specifications that were introduced in the previous sections. We also investigate the extent to which the forecasting accuracy of the linear hybrid model changes when we employ alternative measures of long-term inflation expectations. As in Section 3.2, we use an estimation window that spans the period from 1992Q1 to 2007Q4, and then we produce dynamic out-of-sample forecasts of PCE inflation for 2008Q1 to 2015Q1, conditional on the actual data for inflation expectations, import prices and the different measures of slack in the economy. The forecasting performance across models is compared with the RMSE.
First, we investigate which is the most relevant measure of slack to forecast inflation. Our findings do not provide evidence that the short-term unemployment gap is more powerful than the headline or the long-term unemployment rate in influencing inflation developments (Table   4 ). Hence, in contrast to the evidence by some recent studies, we do not find support for the hypothesis that those out of work for less than 26 weeks have been more influential in determining inflation developments between 2008 and 2015. At the extreme, Krueger et al. (2014) have argued that the long-term unemployed do not exert any influence on inflation, since they are detached from the labour market. Our results do not corroborate this finding.
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Across all specifications, we find that the broader measure of the labour market, the LMTI, is consistently among the best performing specifications, followed by the headline, medium-term and long-term unemployment gaps. Overall, however, the differences in the forecasting accuracy across Phillips curves with alternative slack measures are not large. Our second exercise focuses on the predictive information content from constant-slope nonlinear models and time-varying coefficient models. We employ here three models which were presented in the previous section: the Kalman-filter based model with time-varying coefficients, the rolling regressions, and the non-linear (D-L) model from Table 3 . Overall, the two timevarying models have a considerably higher forecasting power than the linear model with the constant slope. In particular, the increase in accuracy from the rolling regressions model is not surprising ("Rolling"), as it is in line with the findings from Giacomini and White (2006) , in that a rolling-window forecasting scheme is suitable to deal with data heterogeneity and structural shifts in the data. In addition, the time-varying coefficient model ("Kalman") also yields a lower RMSE than the constant slope models shown in column (1). In contrast, the Table 4 indicate that the benchmark specification with the SPF's 10-year ahead PCE inflation ("Linear") is able to outperform the one with the University of Michigan's inflation expectations ("Michigan") . Although the model with the market-based inflation expectations ("5y5y") has a slightly lower RMSE, this is because we employ a different and shorter sample period (the market-based inflation data only start in 1999). In effect, over the same sample period, the model with SPF inflation expectations also outperforms the specification with market-based inflation importance of the expectations in anchoring inflation.
Concluding remarks
Our paper shows that the Phillips curve relationship between inflation and slack remains valid in the United States, by underscoring the importance of taking into account inflation persistence, expectations of future inflation, as well as import prices in addition to the amount of slack in the economy. A model with these determinants is able to explain rather well the behaviour of inflation after the Great Recession, with little apparent evidence of a missing deflation puzzle.
In terms of the forecasting properties of the different slack measures, our out-of-sample exercise finds that slack measured by the LMTI, together with the headline, medium-term and longterm unemployment gaps lead to the best performing specifications. More important than the choice of slack measure, however, is the consideration of a time-variation in the Phillips curve slope; we find tentative evidence that the slope has increased slightly since 2013. Phillips curve models that take into account this change in the slope over time are able to outperform the constant-slope and non-linear models over 2008Q1 to 2015Q1, as shown by a higher forecasting accuracy. Models examined in this paper with specific forms of non-linearities but a constant slope are not able to outperform the linear models, however, as indicated by higher RMSE. (in parentheses) . The dependent variable is the year-on-year change in the PCE deflator over 1992Q1-2015Q1. The measure of inflation expectations is the SPF's 1-year ahead CPI. ∆ 4 denotes year-on-year percentage-point changes. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. (in parentheses) . The dependent variable is the year-on-year change in CPI over 1992Q1-2015Q1. ∆ 4 denotes year-on-year percentage-point changes. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. (in parentheses) . The dependent variable is the year-on-year change in the core PCE deflator over 1992Q1-2015Q1. ∆ 4 denotes year-on-year percentagepoint changes. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. IV regressions with Newey-West corrected standard errors (in parentheses). The IV estimation instruments SPF 10Y PCE and each of the slack measures with 2 lags of their own variables. The dependent variable is the year-on-year change in the PCE deflator over 1992Q1-2015Q1. ∆ 4 denotes year-on-year percentage-point changes. Asterisks, *, **, ***, denote, respectively, statistical significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels. 
